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Translating Happiness 
This year the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) proclaimed March 20th the International Day 
of Happiness. This day is premised on international recognition of the pursuit of happiness as a fundamental human 
goal, and a means of promoting sustainable development. International acknowledgement of the important role that 
happiness plays in development is also displayed in the 2012 World Happiness Report, as well as a host of recent 
changes to national social policies, community infrastructures and health services. The recent shift towards the 
inclusion of happiness in determining sustainable development is exemplified in Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness 
(GNH) and reflected as an indicator of a population’s social progress and well-being (e.g., Gross Happiness Product 
(GHP), Britain’s General Well-Being (GWB), the New Economics Foundation Happy Planet Index, the UN Human 
Development Index and Legatum Prosperity Index). A rank of the world’s happiest countries along a scale of one to 
ten is provided in Columbia University’s Earth Institute’s 2013 World Happiness Report, based on a global survey 
conducted between 2010 and 2012 (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013). As with other global reports, the 2013 World 
Happiness Report proposes greater global expenditures on health and social systems with a particular emphasis on 
psy-interventions. This report is unique in its explicit focus on public policy, and more specifically, the role of 
happiness in the current “major policy debate about the objective for public policy” worldwide, depicted here in the 
form of the Sustainable Development Goals 2015-2030 (emphasis added; Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2013, p. 3). 
Sachs, an author of the report, Director of the Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and head of the 
Earth Institute at Columbia asserts that the stark realities of global poverty and environmental destruction require 
more sustainable approaches to the recognition and achievement of global happiness: “It is no longer good enough 
for economies to grow” (SDSN, 2013). Within this report psy-knowledge and professional expertise is represented 
in images and ideas of nation’s development, environmental stresses and resilient cities, as well as access to mental 
health interventions as resources that can be used to “help get the planet back on course” (SDSN, 2013).  
This special issue of Health, Culture and Society explores the multiple and contested ways of knowing 
happiness embodied in contemporary translations of happiness. According to Rose, translation provides for the 
possibility of government: “In the dynamics of translation, alignments are forged between the objectives of those 
wishing to govern and the personal projects of those organizations, groups, and individuals who are the subjects of 
government” (1999b, p. 48). A desire to construct a comprehensive picture of the important role that translations of 
happiness – as made to appear in social philosophy, featured in the emerging field of positive psychology, mapped 
in global happiness indexes, or communicated by concepts such as ‘well-being’ or ‘quality of life’ – play in 
contemporary understandings of human development and social progress provided the impetus for this special issue. 
Translations of happiness organize consciousness of a beyond that is as yet, already done. Cultural representations 
of how happiness does or does not ‘look’, where happiness is or is not located, when happiness can be expected or 
not expected, the types of people who are ‘really’ happy, and what must be done to achieve, secure, recover and/or 
restore happiness, all provide a view to the dominant values and assumptions that organize our everyday lives.  
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Happiness and Adjustment 
Psy-knowledge and practices translate the philosophical dilemma of human happiness into a technical 
problem. This act of translation involves complex processes of subject formation that activate and invoke the 
authority of science in the conduct of human life. Depression features prominently among psy-understandings of 
happiness. Within this issue depression is conceived as a social phenomenon, a language and a culturally-defined 
mode of participation, a product of modern science and an expression of the definitional power of what Rose refers 
to as the “psy-sciences” (1998, p. 13). In the cultural production of knowledge about depression, hegemonic images 
and ideas of happiness already in circulation in everyday life acquire a technical character which elicit the 
collection, synthesis, transfer and translation of evidence-based knowledge regarding the empirical reality of “the 
good life”, the characteristics of lives worth living, and the facilitators and barriers to happiness for all.  
In the modern project, science has come to symbolize the liberation of the autonomous individual from the 
constraints of religious and traditional orders. Through depression, psychiatry provides a means of framing 
experiences shaped by those newly discovered “freedoms” from dominant social orders. For instance, technical 
knowledge about depression provides a set of instructions for how to interpret the appearance of alienation as a need 
for greater integration. Through depression, responsibility for the experience of alienation is now located in specific 
modes of conducted particular to a new type of person, the “maladjusted” individual. Rose observes a common 
contemporary understanding in which “Maladjustment, it appeared, was at the heart of dissatisfactions” (1999a, p. 
70). The notion of adjustment, of adapting to the conditions believed to produce (un)happiness, presupposes the 
desirability of conformity, if not its inevitability. In treating maladjustment as the reason for unhappiness, and a 
signal of the need of therapeutic intervention, questions concerning how obligatory conditions have been imagined, 
and what interests are involved in their articulation, become superfluous and detractive from the real issue at hand: 
The prevailing unhappiness of a particular population or populations.  
As a science of adaptive behavioural techniques and technologies, psychology provides a way to readjust 
individuals’ relations to their social positions. Dissatisfaction can be addressed and resolved by severing ‘unhealthy’ 
relations and seeking a position that works better. The happiness ideal is not problematic. The availability and 
accessibility of the means of fulfilling this ideal (in its absence) are problematic. Psy-expertise reigns foremost 
among the means of fulfillment, which represents happiness as a choice which when chosen, can empower the 
individual to become “an entrepreneur of itself” (Rose, 1998, p. 158). As Rose asserts in Inventing Ourselves: 
Psychology, Power and Personhood (1998, p. 158): 
 Become whole, become what you want, become yourself; the individual is to become, as it were, an 
entrepreneur of itself, seeking to maximize its own powers, its own happiness, its own quality of life, through 
enhancing its autonomy and then instrumentalizing its autonomous choices in the service of its life-style. The 
self is to style its life through acts of choice, and when it cannot conduct its life according to this norm of 
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choice, it is to seek expert assistance.  
Under the auspices of unlimited human development and social progress, happiness appears as a sign of completion. 
Normative orders are aligned with ‘natural’ orders, and becoming whole involves being able to fulfill a particular 
life-style.  
In The Care of the Self, Foucault describes the intimate relation between modern medicine and the government 
of the soul (1986, pp. 99-100): 
Thus, medicine was not conceived simply as a technique of intervention, relying, in cases of illness, on 
remedies and operations. It was also supposed to define, in the form of a corpus of knowledge and rules, a 
way of living, a reflective mode of relation to oneself, to one’s body, to food, to wakefulness and sleep, to the 
various activities, and to the environment. Medicine was to propose, in the form of a regimen, a voluntary 
and rational structure of conduct.  
In defining a way of living and a reflective mode of relating to oneself, medicine provides a means of effecting and 
enactment of “government at a distance” (Rose, 1999b, p. 49; 1992). According to Rose, governing at a distance is 
made possible when political authorities create “alignments between political aims and the strategies of experts” and 
the personal desires of citizens (1999b, p. 49). In proposing a “voluntary and rational structure of conduct” 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 100), medicine contributes to the power of the modern project of “making-up citizens capable of 
bearing a kind of regulated freedom” (Rose, 1992, p. 174).  
Happiness and Its Role in the Formation of a Technology of Behavior 
The 2003 Report of the President’s Council on Bioethics, “Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit 
of Happiness,” addresses the challenges posed by new therapeutic technologies. The Report finds that the pursuit of 
happiness, while it may be different for each individual, is shaped by our desire “to become superior and stay 
superior” (2003, p. 102). According to the Report: 
Biotechnology offers exciting and promising prospects for healing the sick and relieving the suffering. But 
exactly because of their impressive powers to alter the workings of body and mind, the “dual uses” of the 
same technologies make them attractive also to people who are not sick but who would use them to look 
younger, perform better, feel happier, or become more “perfect.” 
The much-celebrated image of the independent, autonomous individual, not subject to control from the 
outside, may be at risk of falling behind and losing hold of reality in the pursuit for perfectibility. Being superior is 
no longer good enough (or at least, not sustainable). The individual is instructed to think beyond superiority, and as 
such ensure its sustainability (framed in resilience discourse in terms of endurance). In this context, becoming 
superior and staying superior involve catching up to the culturally established expectations of the self. As Elliot 
writes of the American Dream in Better than Well, “It is less a story about trying to get ahead than about the terror 
of being left behind, and the humiliation of crossing the finish line dead last, while the crowd points at you and 
laughs” (2003, p. 298). Refusing to enter the race, “even that publicly announces something to other Americans 
about who you are and what you value” (Elliot, 2003, p. 298). Appearing as one who does not take an active interest 
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in the established values of the group, the predetermined values ordained in psychiatric discourse, could mean 
appearing as one beyond help and understanding.  
The notion that there are people who are beyond understanding, for whom there is no possibility of 
reciprocity of perspectives, is steeped in ongoing histories of colonialism. This notion has been strategically 
deployed to justify the exploitation, marginalization and oppression of colonized peoples. Analyzing happiness as an 
interactionally-achieved cultural phenomenon, we can situate assumptions about the “responsible individual” within 
a history of colonialism (Aubrecht, 2010; Fabris & Aubrecht, Forthcoming).  
Postcolonial theorist Bhabha can help us to think through the processes of subjectification made possible by 
discourses of depression. In The Location of Culture Bhabha (1994), provides a description of ‘beyond’ that sheds 
new light on the problem of common unhappiness, while casting a shadow over the conventional wisdom that views 
present conditions in dualistic terms as “a break or bonding with the past and future.” For Bhabha (1994, p. 4), 
 'Beyond' signifies spatial distance, marks progress, promises the future; but our intimations of exceeding the   
barrier or boundary - the very act of going beyond - are unknowable, unrepresentable, without a return to the 
'present' which, in the process of repetition, becomes disjunct and displaced. 
Dominant understandings of the self mirror conventional imaginations of the present as either a break or a bond, 
rather than a space between (Titchkosky, 2011). This way of thinking is restricted. The individual/past or 
culture/future cannot be imagined without first making reference to the inevitability of the self/present.  
What, at first glance, may appear as obstacles to the pursuit of happiness are actually fundamental to the 
aims of progress. Rather than prevent action, the perception of obstacles to the pursuit of happiness license the 
organization of action, collect otherwise disperate interests, and authorize certain voices to take command. A 
eugencist and controversial actor in the modern drama, Skinner, also takes up the notion of ‘beyond’, and in a way 
that has arguably helped lay the foundation for Rose’s critical analysis of governance analytics. Rose is interested in 
“thinking beyond the State” (1992), through rethinking the powers of freedom. Skinner, however, attends to the 
possibilities for happier populations and a better world beyond the horizon of freedom. In his infamous book, 
Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) Skinner writes, “The important thing is not so much to know how to solve a 
problem as to know how to look for a solution” (p. 153), and the solution tends to appear as a kind of “planned 
diversification” (p. 154). Once framed by interpretive schemas organized by problem/solution binaries human 
particularity can have little relevance for meaningful existence beyond the greater diversification of populations.  
Beyond a Renunciation of Unhappiness 
Freud’s (1989[1917]) work on melancholia introduces the idea that there may be a need to lose happiness 
before happiness can be problematized. The relationship between unhappiness and depression is a paradoxical one. 
Perspectives, such as the one represented in depression, can be read as symptoms of governance. Ways of perceiving 
and thinking, or making, the world can be used to both access and assess problematic conditions of governance and 
develop new ways to address and amend them. The paradox is that the perspective on governance depression offers 
(and with it modern life conceived in terms of life itself), a renunciation of the “unfulfillability” of the social ideal of 
happiness, constitutes that which it renounces (Butler, 1997, p. 142). As a mode of making sense of and governing 
unhappiness, depression demands the existence of unhappy selves, individuals and organizations, in need of 
government.  
Butler (1997) takes up this paradox of governance in her examination of melancholy and gender in The 
Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection. According to Butler, the cultural intolerance towards homosexuality 
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relies on the inhibition of homosexuality for its distinction (original emphasis; 1997, p. 143): 
 In this scenario, renunciation requires the very homosexuality that it condemns, not as its external object, but 
as its own most treasured source of sustenance. The act of renouncing homosexuality thus paradoxically 
strengthens homosexuality, but it strengthens homosexuality precisely as the power of renunciation. 
Renunciation becomes the aim and vehicle of satisfaction. 
Thinking with Rose, one might say that renunciation becomes the motivator. For Rose, the ‘modern’ individual’s 
quest for self-discovery is driven by the belief that “Satisfaction was provided by the motivators.  And the 
motivators were not physical or material, but psychological. Interesting work, feelings of achievement, feelings of 
personal growth, responsibility, and recognition – these were what made people happy.” (1999a, p. 111). 
Renunciation becomes the modern project; through renunciation the individual becomes whole.  
The renunciation of unhappiness that drives the modern project strengthens unhappiness, thus strengthening its 
own drive for completion. The modern project cannot deliver on its promise of complete happiness because its 
power, authority and legitimacy are dependent on the recognition of unhappiness. Its status as a project is contingent 
on its capacity to articulate its problem - unhappiness.  
Discourses of depression give modernity a task capable of organizing and incorporating the interests of 
individuals and collectives, while satisfying their needs for individuality and distinction. Depression produces a 
common sense of unhappiness as a human condition that can be revolutionized, alleviated and potentially cured 
given the appropriate changes in the cultural practices of everyday life. This not only makes unhappiness treatable, it 
alters what it means to be human, while at the same time stripping humanity of its constitutive alterity.  
Rose’s approach to happiness registers Foucault’s understanding of happiness as an instrument for 
governing the soul. Rose, however, makes the problematic character of governance through freedom much more 
explicit. He illustrates how understandings of the self are shaped by psy-technologies and techniques of governance. 
The way individuals experience themselves through knowledge of their desires is influenced by the ways they have 
of conceiving themselves as subjects. The notion of the self provides a way to map out what kinds of government 
are effective and capable of achieving the desired results. The self thus offers a method for measuring the 
advancement of a society and the modernist project.  
The modern project involves more than just economic growth. One way that this ‘more’ is accomplished is 
through the coordination of competing forms of government. And yet, at the same time, economic growth matters. 
No one wants to finish last or be left behind, particularly when what is at stake is as Sachs suggests, the planet, life 
itself.  
(Un)Happy (Re)Assemblages 
Given recognition that, “Programmes and technologies of government, then, are assemblages which may 
have a rationality, but this is not one of a coherence of origin or singular essence” (Rose, 1999, p. 276), the papers in 
this issue are diverse. Even as we are inundated by images and ideals of happiness we are at the same time reminded 
that happiness, whatever it is, continues to elude us. Happiness, it would seem is something we all strive for, 
something that escapes us; the one thing we can never really have or know completely; a quality, a quantity, a way 
of being. And yet, we remain at a loss. What is happiness? Rather than answer the question of what happiness is, 
this special issue provides unique insight into some of the many ways we have of knowing happiness, as a question, 
as a mode of translation, and as such, a program of government; or as Greco and Stenner, as well as Wright, 
suggest, a dispositif. Dominant images, ideas and ideals of happiness mediate consciousness of translation as life 
itself, where life is understood as a bearing and as something that must be born. It is according to this logic, 
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however, that life can be oriented to as burden (too much to bear) and the objective reality of happiness tied to the 
appearance of life as some ‘thing’ suffered.  
Greco and Stenner’s discussion of a happiness dispositif directs attention to the relation between 
subjectivity and economies, while at the same time departing from governmentality studies by attending to 
“affective issues at play in these economies of power, and to the problem of desire.” Central to the happiness 
dispositif is a “bifurcated approach to happiness” that divides the ‘material and the mental’, internal feelings and 
desires from external facts, splitting the subject from the world. Greco and Stenner further suggest that for Keynes 
happiness offered a means of managing pessimism, producing a sense of the ‘not-yet’. Also drawing on Foucault, 
Wright proposes a radical alternative to the notions of well-being and flourishing espoused in positive psychology 
and dominant within Happiness Studies on the grounds that they translate happiness into a utilitarian neoliberal 
governmentality and biopolitics. Wright also draws attention to a bifurcation between East and West, where current 
western mythologies of happiness are imbued with Eastern origins, in this case Bhutan. Wright’s paper recalls 
Said’s seminal work Orientalism, which is further developed in the following paper by McKay. Wright notes that 
rather than Buddhist principles, Gross National Happiness (GNH) indicators reflect a market mentality and an 
interest in modernization and capitalism. For Wright the happiness dispositif is a distinctly neoliberal dispositif.  
The opening papers in the issue all draw attention to the need to consider what Illich refers to as the 
“medicalization of the national budget” (1976, p. 49), as expressed in the GNH. McKay proposes that, “although 
happiness is argued to be the ultimate end of all governmentality, in order to serve as that end, it first needs to be 
translated into a means for bolstering the economy.” McKay focuses on the relation between translations of 
happiness that take the form of ‘mental capital’ and ‘mental well-being’ and an interest in increasing the 
productivity of workers. He suggests that current understandings of preference as an objective measure of subjective 
states produce faith in economic growth as a measure of happiness. In the next paper, Duncan also speaks to 
preference and the emergence of ‘preference patterns’ in consumer behavior in his paper. According to Duncan, “an 
awareness of an ever-impending disorder of depression enables us to act upon ourselves as subjects capable of 
unlimited happiness.”  
Kingfisher, Cantin and Tanaka’s papers explicitly challenge a notion of happiness as the ground of human 
universals. Through an examination of the ‘Samoan way’ Kingfisher offers a view to the current fixation on 
happiness as a EuroAmerican cultural formation, and through this, a powerful counter to the Orientalism of 
Happiness Studies. Central to the Samoan way is a collectivist orientation that exposes the individualism of 
neoliberalism. Kingfisher further develops happiness as a cultural obsession, but in a way that focuses more 
explicitly on cultural rather than psychological dynamics. Cantin critically examines notions of ‘personhood’ and 
‘the good life’ as culturally and historically specific. Cantin’s paper encourages nuanced and situated understandings 
of these concepts that challenge their easy dismissal. Despite the cultural authority of western neoliberal definitions 
of the good life and personhood, there are yet other, and no less vital, ways of relating which these constructs 
embody. The paper that follows considers how dominant cultural scripts can be and are routinely negotiated and re-
written. Through an examination of ‘leprosy literature’ Tanaka provides a view to ‘patient writing’ as a site of 
translation. Within this work translation appears as a space of affirmation – not only of the legitimacy of institutional 
goals, but also of the meaning and value of lives lived within institutionalized settings. Tanaka suggests that even as 
governments, institutions and relief organizations could be viewed as using patients’ stories and poetry about stigma 
they faced in their communities to advance political objectives, leprosy literature should not be reduced to a product 
of coercion.  
All of these papers set the stage for a critical relation to translations of happiness expressed, for example, in 
global cartographies of mental health and illness that reduce the meaning of life to the number of years lived 
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(Titchkosky & Aubrecht, Forthcoming). One poignant example is the geography of depression constructed out of the 
findings from The Global Burden of Disease Study 2010 (Ferrari et al., 2013), summarized and presented as a world 
map laid flat and published for public consumption in the American newspaper The Washington Post (Dewey, 
2013). The map, and the findings on which it is based, support the World Health Organization (WHO)’s (2012) 
representations of depression as one of the leading causes of disability worldwide. Findings also support the WHO’s 
assertion that women are disproportionately affected by depression. This map makes depression visible as a global 
“public health priority” that is disproportionately affecting people in the Middle East and North Africa, “costing 
people in the region years off their lives.” Pathos is thus central to the new science of happiness and the modes of 
adaptation it enjoins. Through pathos happiness is reconceived as a defining moment in the textualization of a global 
body, and with this textualization, the modeling of a global future. In this integrated future both goals and the means 
of their accomplishment are represented in universalizing ways. McMellon’s paper attends the social construction 
and textualization of life. As with previous papers in the issue, this textualization is accomplished through social 
constructions of happiness and their “embodied negotiations” (Werner, 2010), which Werner describes as, “the 
negotiation of social position by subjects marked by race, gender and class is always also a negotiation of spatial 
position in and between localities structured through raced, gendered and class relations” (2010, p. 725).  
As Wright suggests, there is a distinctly bipolitical component of happiness discourse which is made visible 
in plans and policies that aim to advance the measurement and regulation of life itself in the interest, paradoxically, 
of life itself. The primary aim being the extension of the power of the human sciences over the mental lives of 
individuals and populations and, with this, the authority of scienticized and bureaucratized notions of what it means 
to be human. As several papers in this collection argue, hegemonic understandings of happiness under neoliberal 
politics frame the meaning of happiness in terms of capability.  
Resilience: ‘Right’ and ‘Wrong’ Ways of ‘Doing’ Crisis 
Drawing on findings from the World Database of Happiness (Headey & Wearing, 1992) Veenhoven states 
that, “In modern western nations happiness differs little across social categories such as rich and poor or males and 
females. The difference is rather in psychological competence” (2004, p. 77). This then raises the question of who 
(or perhaps more accurately, ‘what type of person’) is psychologically capable, who has the perceived competence 
(i.e., expertise), that qualifies them as being able to do life well. One of the ways that capability is determined is 
through notions of resilience. Through resilience boundaries are drawn between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’; and 
through resilience, knowledge gained on the types of people who have proved they can maximize investments in 
them, and therefore deserve the opportunity to have a try at doing life. For Zola (1977), the almost exclusive focus 
on doing is a marker of our time. As such, it carries with it the risk of reproducing current relations of power.  
A consideration of normative responses to a perceived “crisis in happiness” (2007, p. 7) has served as a 
fundamental guiding principle in assembling this issue. According to Ahmed (2007, p. 7), 
 Happiness is looked for where it is expected to be found, even when happiness is reported as missing. What 
is striking is that the crisis in happiness has not put social ideals into question and if anything has 
reinvigorated their hold over both psychic and political life.  
Modern happiness projects appear to be oriented more to the idea of what is already lost in translation than 
the loss of happiness itself. Thus the need for a turn to language, in this case what Seligman refers to as the ‘new 
vocabulary of resilience’ (Seligman, 2009; Aubrecht, 2012) discussed in variegated ways by many of the issue’s 
authors. Resilience makes the happiness/neoliberal dispositif into what Henry Girioux (2008) refers to as a 
“bipolitics of disposability.” According to Girioux, the transformation of the social state into a corporate state so 
central within neoliberal policy agendas places the authority to decide on questions over life and death in the 
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invisible hands of the market (Girioux, 2008, p. 594). Life is made meaningful in terms of survival, and what was 
once a question of the ‘good life’ translated into a question of survival. The emphasis on ‘flourishing’ can then be 
reconceived as an attempt to shift the public gaze forward, towards a future. The symbolic significance of the word 
future cannot be underestimated. The very possibility of speaking of a future offers an expression of having already 
survived, of knowing how to survive – having expertise in survival (by virtue of having already done it), and of 
being a survivor.  
There is thus a sense of fatalism to the contemporary optimism (Berlant, 2011). Vocabularies of resilience 
carry forward a notion of survival as a doing that is already done. Resilience recalls the embodied experience of 
having survived, the way it can invoke the specter a life lived despite the certainty of death. What is affirmed in 
resilience is neither the worth of individuals, nor even the reality of adversity, as much as it is the discipline of 
psychology and the legitimacy of this way of knowing, thinking, doing and feeling. Seligman, the individual 
credited as founder of positive psychology and expert on resilience and even ‘authentic’ happiness, is forthright with 
this. He says the point of positive psychology is to return psychology to its mission of making normal people more 
productive, i.e., stronger better workers (Seligman, 2011; Seligman, 2008; Seligman & Csikszentmaihalyi, 2000). 
But the problem is, psychology does not know what it wants, it cannot know what normal is without first 
presupposing its absence. That is what resilience does. It is through resilience that a sense of the normal can be 
constructed, through resilience that the neoliberal subject and the fantasy of a universal experience can be made 
‘real’, observable, tangible and affective, something that can be touched, and something with which we are moved. 
New vocabularies of resilience order and mechanize relations so that a judgment can be made: I have survived 
because capitalism has succeeded. The strivings and struggles of marginalized, disabled, pathologized and 
psychologized individuals and groups are reduced to no more than a backdrop against which capitalism can appear 
as a ‘human’ institution, one that cares.  
Vitalism offers a counter to resilience discourses that mystify adversity and construct social inequality, 
exploitation and oppression as natural tests of endurance (Greco & Stenner, this issue; Overboe, 2007). And yet, 
dominant images and ideas of vitalism are also embedded within and circulate by way of the happiness apparatus in 
the form of new normals. 
 ‘New Normals’  
The papers in this issue address how unexamined notions of happiness have been activated as a means to 
justify what disability studies theorist Lennard Davis refers to as the “hegemony of normalcy” (1995, p. 49), as well 
as the inequitable and oppressive relations normalcy both relies on and reproduces (as made to appear in conceptions 
of the ‘global burden’ of disability). Resilience provides a means of returning to normalcy, but this return is not just 
any return. Resilience discourse communicates the need for a particular type of return; a return capable of making 
normalcy better, more profitable and productive, but also more sustainable. In the midst of many ‘new normals’, 
expressed in a host of recent product branding and marketing strategies, including the American-based company 
Johnson & Johnson’s (2013) campaign for Tylenol (a trademark for the pain reliever paracetamol), “Get back to 
normal, whatever your normal is”, It is clear that not any normal will do. Normal, “whatever it is,” is only really 
normal if it endures; can only be counted as normal, and measured as such, if it makes better, and in making better 
lives longer.  
Once situated within vocabularies of resilience, words such as ‘normal’ evoke the need for a cultural 
diagnostics. Thinking with Girioux’s (2008) conception of a “biopolitics of disposability” and Titchksoky’s (2010) 
critical analysis of the cultural production of disability as a “disposable disruption” the worth of a life is determined 
using a utilitarian calculus that is, to reference the Tylenol campaign once more, “tough on pain” (Johnson & 
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Johnson, 2013). Discovering one’s true normal (and with it, one’s subject position) involves accepting normalcy as 
the grounds of life itself and, at the same time, bearing witness to capitalism as the one true human universal. Recent 
reports of global happiness surveys support this perspective (Graham, 2011). Through vocabularies of resilience, 
popular assumptions about what is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ about capitalist relations of labour and exchange organize 
consciousness of subjectivity. These assumptions, structured by neoliberal ideology and economic practices that 
redefine individuals as consumers, suggest that there is no alternative to capitalism. An unproductive and 
unprofitable norm is not only an obstacle to the ‘good life’ but to the survival of life itself.  
Kelly Fritsch provides an insightful critical analysis of such exclusionary forms of inclusion in her 
exploration of the International Symbol of Access (ISA). According to Fritsch, “Happiness is an affective economy 
that allows us to have contact with good objects,” capacitating some bodies and bodily relations at the expense of 
incapacitating and debilitating others. The “not yet” described by Greco and Stenner is given form by Fritsch as the 
“crip to come” (see also Titchkosky, 2011). Also thinking with affect, Patty Douglas analyzes what she refers to as 
the “phenomenon of autism mothers”. Douglas suggests that translation is both governmental and (un)ethical, and 
that understandings of human flourishing can be enlarged by “being-present-with” embodied difference. The social 
and spatial relations between gender and affect are further explored in Bock’s examination of emotion discourse and 
the “stigmatized vernacular” of women’s illness narratives. Within these three papers marginality appears as a 
question of culture and embodiment, and not just a problem to be solved or difference to be transcended. 
Within global happiness discourses the appearance of a common world, communicated by way of expert 
knowledge of global problems, is represented as progress. Each of the articles provides a position from which 
translations of happiness can be viewed as essential to the fiction of the complete self, and preservation of a 
common world, as fully ordinary orders. The specific ways in which each addresses and reconciles the question of 
‘what happiness is’ dislocate naturalistic assumptions of the body that reduce its appearance to a sign of all that is 
right or wrong with the world. 
The Daily Pulse of the Global(ized) Body 
 This is not occupation of territory, on the one hand, and independence of persons on the other. It is the 
country as a whole, its history, its daily pulsation, that are contested […] (Fanon, 1965, p. 65) 
One might suggest that medical translations of happiness are setting the feel and tone for how social 
progress and national development are understood on a global scale. Is happiness a mood? Perhaps not, but much 
may be gained in orienting to happiness as a form of situated consciousness. Focusing on the Canadian context, 
Chris Chapman suggests that the acknowledgement of complicity in oppression requires the cultivation of a 
‘troubled consciousness’, and with it an unsettled relation to identity and refusal to rest easy with one’s social and 
spatial positions. The “bifurcated approach to happiness” introduced by Greco & Stenner is a central feature of 
colonization. Building on Dei’s understanding of colonization as “anything dominating or imposing” (2009, p. 15), 
Kempf asserts that, “Colonization is the process whereby abstract social locations become sites for concrete 
oppressions” (2009, p. 16). Colonization cannot be reduced to an event in world history that left its mark on the 
present. It is, rather, an assemblage of embodied process that involves the imposition of dominant culture through 
the exploitation and appropriation of material wealth as well as control over mental life. What Kempf refers to as 
“abstract social locations”, and what could be understood in terms of social types, become actual sites of oppression. 
These processes are expressed in Hwahng’s analysis, powerfully so in the following assertion: “As someone who 
grew up fully ensconced within the ‘racist social scripting’ of Asian Americans as the ‘model minority’ (Lowe, 
1996), I have felt cut off from the richness of information flow that is possible from their embodiment as Koreans 
because of the suppression of their histories and realities.”  
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Many of the papers in this issue draw attention to the global circulation of psy-knowledge as a means of 
rationalizing exploitation and oppression. A small number of self-proclaimed global bodies lay claim to expertise on 
the subjective lives of the world’s people. This form of colonization is particularly insidious. Marginalization is 
made concrete through demonstrations of the inferiority of the marginalized and through facts and figures that reify 
and naturalize disadvantage. Despite claims to the contrary, and the best intentions, the ordinary (dominant) ways of 
addressing marginalization reproduce the authority of conventional knowledge about the meaning of social 
locations, and with it, political and psychic processes of colonization.  
As a tool of colonization, the meaning of happiness is transformed into a measure of what’s working or not 
working, as well as a means of constructing new improved tools for assessing and evaluating the worth of 
communities under the auspices of development. But in global happiness discourse, happiness does not only offer a 
measure of what’s working or not, but who’s working or not. This occurs on two levels. On the first level, the types 
of people who do and do not have ‘gainful employment’ and on another, who does and does not fit as a labourer 
within the capitalist schema (Titchkosky & Aubrecht, Forthcoming). The appearance of happiness, therefore, 
provides a (bio)marker of who is imagined and welcomed within an image of the global community.  
Conclusion 
Chandler and Rice reflect on the relationship between happiness and the cultural production of non-
conforming or ‘unruly’ bodies as uninhabitable. They ask,  
In the midst of the requirement to be happy while living in an ableist, fat-phobic culture in which our bodies 
are not recognised as inhabitable, how can we, disabled and fat people, create and find moments of alterity 
in/of happiness? How can we locate, and even dwell in an alterity, where we can express happiness in 
difference rather than in spite of it and, at the same time, not discount social suffering caused by ableism and 
fat-phobia? 
Their reflection is anchored in an analysis of “biopedagogies”, which they define as assemblages of 
“information, advice, and instruction about bodies, psyches, health, and well being, often moralizing or lecturing in 
tone, that works to control people by using praise and shame alongside ‘expert knowledge’ to urge their conformity 
to mental and physical norms.” An excellent example of an analysis of biopedagogies is presented in Söderfeldt and 
Verstraete’s examination of the role of happiness in the establishment and transformation of care structures and 
practices for persons with disabilities by way of their consideration of the question of whether the blind or the deaf 
should be considered the most unhappy. In Silke’s paper we are reminded that any struggle to live is also a “struggle 
for human dignity” (Gilly, as cited in Fanon, 1965, p. 12) that is critical of systems thinking and versions of 
happiness that restrict knowledge of happiness to indicators of ‘quality of life’ (for a disability studies critique of 
quality of life see Asch, 2001).  
As Marcus and Baehrisch illustrate, the pursuit of happiness is oriented by predefined aesthetic ideals that 
can lead individuals to pursue goals that may be self-defeating. Through happiness the search for something else, 
alterity, becomes material, tangible, doable, real, through happiness that a beyond (figured in terms of a ‘not yet’ or 
a ‘to come’) materializes as an object of desire, and the desirer a subject of government. A rather melancholic 
relation to happiness is thus observed in which, whatever happiness is, it is best treated as some ‘thing’ (for 
example, a smile) that can be known, recorded, preserved and made part of the archive, so as to be expected. One 
might even say there is something pedagogical to this melancholia, given that it rests on recognition of happiness as 
a lesson (to be) learned, a benchmark that must be met in order to pass. In this issue O’Brien advocates for a more 
sustainable understanding of happiness which recognizes that “our happiness and well-being are intertwined with 
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the happiness and well-being of other people, other species and the natural environment.” O’Brien provides a 
detailed history of this global movement in happiness, beginning with Bhutan, and recommendations for how to 
integrate this knowledge on the ground within educational systems. Ng and Fisher follow O’Brien and resist a 
dismissive relation to well-being, proposing instead multi-level psychological understandings of well-being that 
challenge Cartesian dualism. 
Thus far we have considered translations of happiness as mediations of the world. These understandings 
recognize a performative to happiness: happiness does something. Morgan, who closes this special issue, frames 
happiness in terms of nothing to do. Through case studies, Morgan invites his reader to consider the possibility that 
relations to happiness are not only the product of naturalistic views that define individuals in terms of bodily 
capabilities and constraints. Thinking with Morgan, relations to happiness also appear in the form of moments of 
recollection. The task for socially just pedagogies and praxes then becomes how to nurture the appearances of such 
moments without reducing them to empty signifiers of life itself; how to recognize vitality in terms of being open to 
the embodied actuality of a moment, and the difference moments can make to how life is lived, experienced and 
understood. Conventional dichotomous notions of happiness that restrict happiness to a continuum along which 
individuals are defined in terms of degrees of pleasure or pain should be discarded for the violence they enact. Such 
understandings of happiness compel the willful forgetting of death, loss and grief in the interest of self-preservation. 
Titchkosky opens this issue with a critical understanding of translation as an invitation for self-reflexivity and an 
occasion for encountering happiness as a social act. It is to this opening that the issue now turns. 
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